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NOTE
PHYSICIAN PRIVILEGES: JUDICIAL TREATMENT
OF THE DISCHARGED PHYSICIAN
Brian Lester*
INTRODUCTION
Remedies for physicians whose privileges are reduced depend, in
large part, on a court's determination of the character of the hospi-
tal's decision, rather than a court's ascertainment of the shared expec-
tations between the physician and the hospital. Some courts,
however, have applied contractual principals to medical staff bylaws to
effect the expectations of the parties. Arthur Corbin characterized
the primary purpose of contract law as "the realization of reasonable
expectations that have been induced by the making of a promise."'
As late as the 1970s, however, most courts refused to recognize the
existence of reasonable expectations between physicians and hospitals
that would allow physicians to recover under breach of contract for
wrongful discharge.2 A physician's remedy against the hospital was
subject to minimal judicial review in order to avoid adversely interfer-
ing with arbitrary and discriminatory hospital decisions.3
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2002; BA_, University of
Washington, 1998. This Note is dedicated to my parents for their love and generous
support. I would like to thank Professors Jay Tidmarsh and Anthony Bellia of the
Notre Dame Law School for providing me with invaluable suggestions throughout the
process. I also wish to thank Ed Caspar, Lee Dejulius, Christina Rissler, and Christian
Schultz for their helpful comments and encouragement from the beginning.
I ARTHm L. CORBiN, CORBIN ON CoNTRACTS § 1 (1952).
2 See infra Part II.
3 See Shulman v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 222 F. Supp. 59, 64-65 (D.D.C. 1963); ser also
Sosa v. Bd. of Managers, 437 F.2d 173, 176-77 (5th Cir. 1971); Suess v. Pugh, 245 F.
Supp. 661, 667-68 (N.D. W. Va. 1965).
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About the same time, state legislatures enacted legislation requir-
ing hospitals to enact medical staff bylaws4 to govern the hospitals'
relationships with all practicing physicians,5 partly in response to the
malpractice "crisis."6 Eventually most courts recognized bylaws as a set
of enforceable promises, establishing procedural protections for phy-
sicians who were not re-appointed or were discharged, even to those
physicians who enjoy medical staff privileges as members of an open
medical staff because they do not have an independent employment
contract.7
4 Medical staff bylaws are a set of policies and procedures that govern physicians
on the medical staff, which is comprised of member physicians at a particular hospi-
tal. SeeJune D. Zellers & Michael R. Poulin, Termination of Hospital Medical StaffPrivi-
leges for Economic Reasons: An Appeal for Consistency, 46 ME. L. REV. 67, 69 (1994).
Bylaws define the scope of the relationship between the physician and the hospital,
including organizational principles within the medical staff, the standards of physi-
cian conduct, the requirements and procedures for obtaining and maintaining medi-
cal staff privileges, and amendment of the bylaws. See id. As the servicing of health
care has grown in complexity to include insurance companies, hospitals, physicians,
and government, bylaws "lay the foundation for those business relationships that will
carry physicians, in conjunction with the rest of the hospital, to success in the fulfill-
ment of quality and economic goals." DANIm A. L'NG ET AL., MANAGING MEDICAL
STAFF CHANGE THROUGH Bm.tws AND OTHER STRATEGIES, at ix (1995).
5 See Craig W. Dallon, UnderstandingJudicial Review of Hospitals' Physician Creden-
tialing and Peer Review Decisions, 73 TEMP. L. REv. 597, 608 (2000) (citation omitted).
6 Through increased malpractice claims, the public and the courts exerted pres-
sure on hospitals to change their organizational structure to improve quality of care.
SeeJennifer S. Anderson, Comment, All True Histories Contain Instruction: Why HAlOs
Cannot Avoid Malpractice Liability Through Independent Contracting with Physicians, 29 MC.
GEORGE L. Rxv. 323, 324, 333-38 (1998); Dallon, supra note 5, at 603.
7 See Brad Dallet, Note, Economic Credentialing: Your Money or Your Life!, 4 HFALHr
MrnTIx 325, 331-37 (1994).
Although many state courts recognize that medical staff bylaws carry contractual
obligations, approaches differ significantly in the extent to which a physician is pro-
tected under the bylaws. Several courts have rejected bylaws as contractually enforce-
able. See, e.g., Ingraffia v. NME Hosps., Inc., 943 F.2d 561, 565-66 (5th Cir. 1991);
Robles v. Humana Hosp. Cartersville, 785 F. Supp. 989, 1000-02 (N.D. Ga. 1992);
Balkissoon v. Capitol Hill Hosp., 558 A.2d 304, 308 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Gianetti v. Nor-
walk Hosp., 557 A.2d 1249, 1255 (Conn. 1989); St. Mary's Hosp., Inc. v. Radiology
Prof'l Corp., 421 S.E.2d 731, 736 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992); Long v. Chelsea Cmty. Hosp.,
557 N.W.2d 157, 161-62 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996); Zipper v. Health Midwest, 978 S.W.2d
398, 417 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); Manczur v. Southside Hosp., 183 N.Y.S.2d 960, 962
(App. Div. 1959); Mahmoodian v. United Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 404 S.E.2d 750, 755-56 (W.
Va. 1991).
Other courts construe bylaws as a contract on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g.,Janda
v. Madera Cmty. Hosp., 16 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1186-89 (E.D. Cal. 199.8); Steuer v. Nat'l
Med. Enters., Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1489, 1527 (D.S.C. 1987); Richter v. Danbury, 759
A.2d 106, 110-11 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000); Keskin v. Munster Med. Research Found,,
580 N.E.2d 354, 359-62 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Terre Haute Reg'l Hosp., Inc. v. El-Issa,
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In deciding these types of cases, courts would determine whether
the hospital complied with the express bylaw reappointment and ter-
mination provisions.8 Hospitals continue to have the option of main-
taining an open staff in which any individual physician may apply for
membership to the medical staff, or alternatively, they, as a collective
whole, can establish a dosed staff by entering into an exclusive con-
tract with a third party physician. With an exclusive contract, the staff
is "dosed" in the sense that the parties are bound "to buy or sell only
from each other for their total requirements."9 When a hospital en-
ters into an exclusive contract with a physician or group of physicians,
those physicians who had enjoyed the privileges from open staff mem-
bership are estopped from further exercising those privileges con-
tained in the exclusive contract. This phenomenon is referred to as
"constructive revocation." 10
Traditionally, courts have limited a physician's remedy under the
bylaws to hospital decisions based upon judgment of the physician's
competence. In the exclusive contract setting, courts have had diffi-
cultyjustifying a remedy, since the expressed bylaw procedures usually
do not account for these decisions.11 Bylaws are typically silent as to
hospital managerial decisions motivated for economic reasons having
little, if any, relationship to the physician's competence, and courts
470 N.E.2d 1371, 1376-77 (Ind: Ct. App. 1984); Tredrea v. Anesthesia & Analgesia,
P.C., 584 N.W.2d 276, 284-87 (Iowa 1998); Munoz v. Flower Hosp., 507 N.E.2d 360,
364-66 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985); Weary v. Baylor Univ. Hosp., 360 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1962); Bass v. Ambrosius, 520 N.W.2d 625, 628 (Is. Ct. App. 1994); cf.
Bryant v. Glen Oaks Med. Ctr., 650 N.E.2d 622, 629 (Ill. App. CL 1995) (holding that
the presence of an at-will arrangement barred relief).
Still other courts treat bylaws as a contract per se. Se, e.g., Pariser v. Christian
Health Care Sys., Inc., 816 F.2d 1248, 1251 (8th Cir. 1987); Posner v. Lankenau
Hosp., 645 F. Supp. 1102, 1106, 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Samaritan Health Sys. v. Supe-
rior Court, 981 P.2d 584, 588 (Ariz. CL App. 1998); Lawler v. Eugene Wuesthoff
Mem'l Hosp. Ass'n, 497 So. 2d 1261, 1264-66 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1986); Gashgai v.
Me. Med. Ass'n, 350 A.2d 571, 575 (Me. 1976); Virmani v. Presbyterian Health Sers.
Corp., 488 S.E.2d 284, 288--89 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997); St.John's Hosp. Med. Staff v. St.
John Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 245 N.W.2d 472, 474-75 (S.D. 1976); Lewisburg Cmty.
Hosp., Inc. v. Alfredson, 805 S.W.2d 756, 759 (Tenn. 1991).
8 See infra Part III.B.
9 Charles R. Galloway, Comment, Observation: Exdusie Contracts and the StaffPhy-
sician, 66 Miss. LJ. 479, 480 (1996).
10 Bartley v. E. Me. Med. Ctr., 617 A.2d 1020, 1021, 1023 (Me. 1992).
11 SeeJohn D. Blum, The Evolution of Physician Credentialing into Managd Care Selec-
tive Contracting, 22 AM. J.L. & Mmn. 173, 182 (1996); Neil L Chayet & Thomas M.
Reardon, Trouble in the Medical Staff A Practical Guide to Hospital Initiated Quality Assur-
ance, 7 A. J.L. & Mm. 301, 309 (1981) (citations omitted).
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have generally refused to "second guess" managerial decisions.'
Thus, many courts that have held that medical staff bylaws may consti-
tute a contract also hold that a hospital's decision to enter into an
exclusive contract is outside the contemplation of the parties and,
consequently, unenforceable.' 3
Unfortunately, courts' general refusal to provide a remedy to a
hospital's decision to contract exclusively with another physician
leaves the physician whose privileges become nonexercisable at the
mercy of a hospital's managerial discretion and without adequate judi-
cial review. While courts have made great strides in protecting physi-
cians' interests in fair and informed decisions and the public's interest
in quality care, the remedial protection does not go far enough. To
more accurately effect the reasonable expectations of the physicians
and hospitals, courts should extend protection under contract law to
provide physicians whose privileges have been constructively revoked,
due to an exclusive contract, a remedy for breach of the bylaw
contract.
Part I provides background on the typical hospital organizational
structure and the evolving relationship between the hospital and the
physician. Part II explores past jurisprudential approaches to review-
ing hospitals' decisions that fail to conform to the reappointment and
disciplinary procedures outlined in the medical staff bylaws. Part III
discusses the emerging judicial trend toward recognizing bylaws as
12 See Richter v. Danbury Hosp., No. 307869, 1998 WL 321853, at *4 (Conn.
Super. Ct. June 9, 1998), rev'd in part, 759 A.2d 106 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000); Bloom v.
Clara Maass Med. Ctr., 685 A.2d 966, 972 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996); Read v.
McKennan Hosp., 610 N.W.2d 782, 786 (S.D. 2000); Tenet Health Ltd. v. Zamora, 13
S.W.3d 464, 469 (Tex. App. 2000).
13 See Blum, supra note 11, at 181-82 (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Hager v.
Venice Hosp., 944 F. Supp. 1530, 1534 (M.D. Fla. 1996); Hutton v. Mem'l Hosp., 824
P.2d 61, 62-63 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991); Richter, 1998 WL 321853, at *4; Garibaldi v.
Applebaum, 742 N.E.2d 279, 284-85 (Ill. 2000); Janes v. Centegra Health Sys., 721
N.E.2d 702, 708-09 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); Keskin v. Munster Med. Research Found., 580
N.E.2d 354, 359-62 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Dutta v. St. Francis Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 867
P.2d 1057, 1062-63 (Kan. 1994); St. Louis v. Baystate Med. Ctr., 568 N.E.2d 1181,
1187-88 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991); Bloom, 685 A.2d at 972; Lyons v. St. Vincent Health
Ctr., 731 A.2d 206, 212-13 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999) (in 'dicta); Read, 610 N.W.2d at
786-87; Tenet Health Ltd., 13 S.W.3d at 469-70; Gonzalez v. San Jacinto Methodist
Hosp., 880 S.W.2d 436, 439-40 (Tex. App. 1994), rev'd on other grounds sub nor.
Calvillo v. Gonzalez, 922 S.W.2d 928, 929 (Tex. 1996). But seeVakharia v. Little Co. of
Mary Hosp. & Health Care Ctrs., 917 F. Supp. 1282, 1292-93 (N.D. Il. 1996); Lobo v.
Rock, No. CV 920332930S, 1996 WL 564049, at *8-*9 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 20,
1996); Ray v. St. John's Health Care Corp., 582 N.E.2d 464, 470-71 (Ind. Ct. App.
1991); Volcjak v. Wash. County Hosp. Ass'n, 723 A.2d 463, 471-72 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1999).
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contractually binding when a physician's privileges are revoked or re-
stricted on grounds relating to the physician's competence. Part IV
will suggest that the courts should extend to the physician procedural
remedies when a physician's membership on the medical staff is ad-
versely affected due to a hospital's decision to enter into an exclusive
contract with a third party. This would provide an "at-will" physician
who is a member of the medical staff and whose privileges are con-
structively revoked a remedy when the hospital breaches implied
promises found in the bylaws and in the parties' conduct.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Hospital Organizatiod and Reorganization
Hospitals, as recently as the early twentieth century, consisted of
physicians independently providing community-based care, utilizing
the hospital only when the patient's health required. The hospital
simply acted as a forum for patient and physician interaction.1 4 By
contrast, today's hospitals have been transformed into corporation-
type entities with responsibilities for advancing quality health care and
controlling escalating costs through managed care.'5 Traditional hos-
pitals maintained little physician oversight and were ill-prepared for
malpractice claims; thus, a new system had to be structured around
managed quality in the servicing of health care.' 6 Hospitals have real-
ized that they can become profit-driven enterprises through applying
the structural and operational principles of corporations. 17
14 See John G. Day, Managed Care and the Medical Profession: Old Issues and Old
Tensions the Building Blocks of Tomorrou,'s Health Care Ddhey and Financing Systen, 3
CoNN. INS. LJ. 1, 6--7 (1996); Paul L. Scibetta, RestructuringHospital.Physician Relations.
Patient Care Quality Depends on the Health of Hospital Peer Retieu, 51 U. Prrr. L REv.
1025, 1025 (1990); Zellers & Poulin, supra note 4, at 67.
15 See Scibetta, supra note 14, at 1025. In fact, surveys indicate that nonprofit
hospitals are converting to for-profit at a record rate, finding that betveen 1990 and
1996 approximately 200 of the remaining 5000 nonprofit hospitals converted. See
Terri R. Reicher, Assuring Competent Oversight to Hospital Conversion Transactions, 52
BAYLOR L REv. 83, 84 (2000) (citation omitted).
16 See Scibetta, supra note 14, at 1026-27. Courts began imposing vicarious tort
liability on hospitals, replacing the charitable immunity doctrine that shielded hospi-
tals from their physicians' negligence. See Barry 11. Furrow, Enterprise Liaability and
Health Care Reform: Managing Care and Managing Risl, 39 ST. Louis U. LJ. 79, 83-84
(1994).
17 See David H. Rutchik, The Emerging Trad of Corporate Liability: Courts' Uneven
Treatment of Hospital Standards Leaves Hospitals Uncertain and Exposed, 47 VAuN. L REx.
535, 538-39 (1994). Private hospitals are often owned by large corporations, and
some hospitals are even traded on the NewYork Stock Exchange. Id.; se also Thomas
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Modem hospitals are typically organized with a Board of Direc-
tors18 and a medical staff, both organized to ensure quality through
oversight and enforcement of policies and procedures. 19 The Board
of Directors approves bylaws and, pursuant to the bylaws, makes final
decisions relating to appointments and re-appointments to the staff,
as well as the granting and revising of privileges.20 Standards promul-
gated by the joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Orga-
nizations (JCAHO)21 require that accredited hospitals establish and
maintain medical staff bylaws. 2 Membership on the medical staff pro-
vides physicians with access to the hospital's facilities and provides the
hospital with quality control capability.2 3 The medical staff, com-
prised of fully licensed practitioners permitted by law to provide un-
supervised patient care,24 performs two primary functions for
physicians and hospitals: credentialing and peer review.2 5 The former
entails determining which physicians are granted staff membership
and the types of privileges they will have as a member, while the latter
involves monitoring the physicians' services.2 6 In all but rare cases,2 7
appointment to the medical staff is a prerequisite to enjoyment of
privileges that permit physicians to admit patients to the hospital
within a specified area of practice.28
B. Medical Staff Privileges
Hospitals are increasingly cautious in granting and renewing staff
privileges because of public pressure to maintain quality care and vica-
William Malone & Deborah Haas Thaler, Managed Health Care: A Plaintiff's Perspective,
32 TORT & INS. L.J. 123, 124-30 (1996) (citation omitted).
18 Also referred to as the Board of Trustees or the Governing Board.
19 See generally William M. Copeland & Phyllis E. Brown, Hospital Medical StaffPriv-
ilege Issues: "Brother's Keeper" Revisited, 17 N. Ky. L. REV. 513 (1990) (describing the
relationship between the Governing Board and the medical staff).
20 See Dallon, supra note 5, at 610.
21 JCAHO is a private accrediting institution that determines the acceptability of
the services at a particular hospital through articulating standards. See Berry R. Fur-
row, Regulating the Managed Care Revolution: Private Accreditation and a New System Ethos,
43 ViLL. L. REV. 361, 396 (1998) (citations omitted).
22 See Chayet & Reardon, supra note 11, at 304.
23 See Scibetta, supra note 14, at 1029-30.
24 See Dale H. Cowan, Medical Staff Legal Issues, 17 U. TOL. L. REv. 851, 857
(1986).
25 See Dallon, supra note 5, at 598; Mark A. Kadzielski et al., The Hospital Medical
Staff. What Is Its Future?, 16 WHrriTR L. REV. 987, 999 (1995).
26 See Blum, supra note 11, at 176-79; Dallon, supra note 5, at 598.
27 See Cowan, supra note 24, at 857-58.
28 See Dallon, supra note 5, at 608-09.
[VOL- 76151496
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rious malpractice liability for the negligence of their medical staff.-9
In order to practice at a particular hospital, physicians must obtain
privileges.3 0 Furthermore, competition among physicians has intensi-
fied as numbers in the profession have risen,3 ' while the number of
hospitals has declined.3 2 While past physicians could maintain an in-
dependent practice, physicians today, who are almost all specialized,
increasingly rely on hospitals for stbff privileges for access to pa-
tients.33 As the relationship between physicians and hospitals contin-
ues to evolve, denial or revocation of medical staff privileges may
essentially prevent a physician from practicing in a community.m As
exclusive contracts are increasingly used for physician staffing,3 5 those
physicians not privy to the exclusive contract and whose privileges are
covered in the exclusive contract are prevented from practicing at that
hospital.
29 The application of vicarious liability to hospitals was first adopted by the Illi-
nois Supreme Court in Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospita4 200 N.E.2d
149 (III. 1964) (holding that the hospital has a duty to provide sufficient medical
care).
30 See Hayman v. Galveston, 273 U.S. 414, 417 (1927).
31 See Jerry Cromwell, Barriers to Adcieving a Cost-Effective Wortforce Mix: Lessons
from Anesthesiology, 24J. HEALTH POL, POL'Y & L 1331, 1332-35 (1999).
32 See Thomas R. Prince, The Healtware Industry Bankruptcy Wodrout% 8 A-.t. Bxuar.
INST. L. REV. 5, 30 (2000).
33 See Pallet, supra note 7, at 326; Day, supra note 14, at 11-12; Furrow, supra note
21, at 377; Jesse A. Goldner, Managed Care and Mental Health: Clinital Perspecties and
Legal Realities, 35 Hous. L. REv. 1437, 1439-40 (1999); Prince, supra note 32, at 55;
Ann R Cough, Note, Quality of Care Staff Privileges, and Antitrust Law, 64 U. DEF. L
Rsv. 505, 506 (1987).
34 See Mallare v. St. Luke's Hosp., 699 F. Supp. 1127, 1130 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Dal-
Ion, supra note 5, at 613; Kathleen M. Dorr, Annotation, Exclusion of orDiscrimination
Against, Physician or Surgeon by Hospital, 28 A.L.R5TH 107 § 2(a) (1995).
35 See Bruce L McDaniel, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Contract Between
Hospital and Physician Providing for Exclusive Medical Services, 74 A.LR.3D 1268, 1269
(1976). This phenomenon is otherwise known as a "closed staff." Id. Before the
movement toward medical staffs and hospital standardization, some hospitals oper-
ated on an "open staff" basis and allowed most physicians to direct patients to the
hospital. See Dallon, supra note 5, at 602. An era where the physician is periodically
re-evaluated for reappointment has replaced an era where the community-based phy-
sician's privileges could only be lost upon a finding of incompetence. See Zellers &
Poulin, supra note 4, at 67.
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C. The Legal Relationship Between the Hospital and the Physician
Often arrangements between the hospital and the physician per-
mit the physician to leave at will.36 An at-willphysician with staff mem-
bership remains bound by the bylaws and faces sanctions for
violations.3 7 Courts have generally held that a physician's member-
ship status to the medical staff and enjoyment of privileges, absent a
separate employee contract, does not independently constitute an em-
ployment relationship.38 In most instances, 39 a physician is an inde-
pendent contractor because the hospital lacks direct control over the
physician's practice and the physician is paid directly by the patient or
insurer.40 Due to the independent contractor status, typical employ-
ment law remedies are unavailable.41 As discussed below, this makes
the staff physician without a contract vulnerable should the hospital
decide to contract exclusively with another physician or group of
physicians.
II. COMMON-LAw APPROACHES TOWARD PHYSICIANs
A. Private Hospitals
The outcome of a controversy involving a physician who sought
relief against the hospital originally depended on whether the hospi-
tal was private or public. 42 Today, this distinction has eroded in many
36 See, e.g., Abrams v. St. John's Hosp. & Health Ctr., 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 603, 605
(Ct. App. 1994); Hrehorovich v. Harbor Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 614 A.2d 1021, 1030 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1992); Galloway, supra note 9, at 488.
37 See Terre Haute Reg'l Hosp., Inc. v. EI-Issa, 470 N.E.2d 1371, 1377 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1984).
38 See, e.g., Abrams, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 604-05; see also Dallon, supra note 5, at 605
n.45.
39 In the area of malpractice action against hospitals, courts are applying agency
principles that hold hospitals vicariously liable for their physicians' negligence. See
Furrow, supra note 16, at 86-87.
40 See William S. Brewbaker III, Physician Unions and the Future of Competition in the
Health Care Sector, 33 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 545, 553-55 (2000); Dallon, supra note 5, at
606.
41 See Dallon, supra note 5, at 606-07.
42 See, e.g., Shulman v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 222 F. Supp. 59, 61 (D.D.C. 1963);
Kiracofe v. Reid Mem'l Hosp., 461 N.E.2d 1134, 1137-38 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); Gotsis
v. Lorain Cmty. Hosp., 345 N.E.2d 641, 646 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974); Dorr, supra note
34, § 2(a). The Shulman court, in its discussion of determining the status of a hospi-
tal, cited the Supreme Court of Maryland which posited:
A public corporation is an instrumentality of the State, founded and owned
by the State in the public interest, supported by public funds, and governed
by managers deriving their authority from the State .... On the other hand,
a corporation organized by permission of the Legislature, supported largely
[VOL. 76:5r1498
PHYSICIAN PRIVILEGES
jurisdictions.43 Courts gave private hospitals near absolute discretion
to exclude a physician from medical staffs,4 unless acting under
"color of law."45 The court in Slulman v. Washington Hospital Center
explained that "U]udicial tribunals are not equipped to review the ac-
tion of hospital authorities in selecting or refusing to appoint mem-
bers of medical staffs, declining to review appointments previously
made, or excluding physicians or surgeons from hospital facilities."46
After state legislatures began requiring hospitals to promulgate medi-
cal staff bylaws, courts modified judicial review for private hospitals to
ensure that the hospital's decision to discipline or deny reappoint-
ment substantially complied with the procedures in its bylaws.47 In
by voluntary contributions, and managed by officers and directors who are
not representatives of the State or any political subdivision, is a private cor-
poration, although engaged in charitable work or performing duties similar
to those of public corporations.
Shulman, 222 F. Supp. at 61-62 (quoting Levin v. Sinai Hosp., 46 A.2d 298, 300 (Md.
1946)).
43 See e.g., Truly v. Madison Gen. Hosp., 673 F.2d 763,765 (5th Cir. 1982) (recog-
nizing that disciplinary actions subject to limited review of "any hospital licensed");
Duffield v. Mem'l Hosp. Ass'n, 361 F. Supp. 398, 401 n.2 (S.D. W. Va. 1973); Cipriotti
v. Bd. of Dirs. of Northridge Hosp. Found. Med. Cr., 196 Cal. Rptr. 367, 372-74 (CL
App. 1983); Claycomb v. HCA-Raleigh Cmty. Hosp., 333 S.E.2d 333, 335-36 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1985).
44 SeeYarnell v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Serv., Inc., 446 N.E.2d 359, 361 (Ind.
C. App. 1983); se, e.g., Brooks v. Arlington Hosp. Ass'n, 850 F.2d 191, 198-99 (4th
Cir. 1988); Wong v. Garden Park Cmty. Hosp., 565 So. 2d 550, 553 (Miss. 1990) (not-
ing that at common law, the hospital had a right to revoke privileges for good cause);
cf Willis v. Santa Ana Cmty. Hosp. Ass'n, 376 P.2d 568, 570 (Cal. 1962) (holding that
the hospital's discretion acts "as fiduciary power[ ] to be exercised reasonablyand for
the public good"); Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 192 A.2d 817, 824 (NJ. 1963);
Woodard v. Porter Hosp., Inc., 217 A.2d 37, 40 (Vt. 1966) (limiting private hospital
discretion to reasonable and sound decisions).
45 See Gotsis, 345 N.E.2d at 646 ("The test for determining 'state action' is whether
or not there was significant state involvement in the priate conduct warranting the
application of constitutional due process; and that action must proximately result in
the injury which is the subject of the complaint."); see also Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d
710, 712-15 (4th Cir. 1964); Sokol v. Univ. Hosp., Inc., 402 F. Supp. 1029, 1030-32
(D. Mass. 1975); Natale v. Sisters of Mercy, 52 N.W.2d 701, 709 (Iowa 1952).
46 Shulman, 222 F. Supp. at 64.
47 See e.g., Samuel v. Herrick Mem'l Hosp., 201 F.3d 830, 835-36 (6th Cir. 2000);
Shulman, 222 F. Supp. at 62-63; Kiester v. Humana Hosp. Alaska, Inc., 843 P.2d 1219,
1223 n.2 (Alaska 1992); Owens v. New Britain Gen. Hosp., 643 A.2d 233, 239-40
(Conn. 1994);Jain v. N.W. Cmty. Hosp., 385 N.E.2d 108, 112-13 (I1. App. Ct. 1978);
Nagib v.- St. Therese Hosp., Inc., 355 N.E.2d 211, 213 (I1I. App. Ct. 1976) (citing
Virgin v. Am. Coll. of Surgeons, 192 N.E.2d 414, 422 (I1. App. Ct. 1963)); Stillerv. La
Porte Hosp., Inc., 570 N.E.2d 99, 103 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Yarndl, 446 N.E.2d at 361;
Wong, 565 So. 2d at 553; Gotsis, 345 N.E.2d at 647. Some courts add that the hospital's
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doing so, courts began to recognize the emergence of reasonable ex-
pectations of the physician brought about through the hospital's pro-
mulgation of medical staff bylaws. Courts introduced limited judicial
review of private hospitals to reflect the increasing importance of hos-
pitals in determining the physician's livelihood, which courts began to
recognize needed more judicial oversight.48
B. Public Hospitals
Even prior to the introduction of bylaws, courts required public
hospitals to give sufficient notice and provide a fair hearing, aimed at
protecting physicians from arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory
decisions. 49 Courts applied greater scrutiny to public hospitals' deci-
sions on due process and equal protection grounds.50 Despite consti-
tutional protection, however, judges gave public hospitals significant
discretion, as exemplified by the Oregon State Supreme Court:
An additional reason for allowing hospitals, even though they are
public hospitals, a wide range of discretion is the possibility of inde-
pendent tort liability ... including liability for the mere selection
and admission of physicians .... In such circumstances a hospital
must necessarily be vested With considerable discretion in staff
matters.
5 1
Public hospitals enjoyed judicial discretion based upon the belief
that "courts should not substitute their judgment for hospital agency
judgment."52 One court, in dicta, admitted to the inherent harshness
of granting hospitals broad discretion, but held that not all wrongs are
legally actionable.55
Illustrative of an approach limited to arbitrary, capricious, and
discriminatory decisions is Balkissoon v. Capital Hill Hospital5 4 There,
decision be rational and procedurally fair. See Sywak v. O'Connor Hosp., 244 Cal.
Rptr. 753, 758-59 (Ct. App. 1988); Leider v. Beth Israel Hosp. Ass'n, 229 N.Y.S.2d
134, 136-37 (Sup. Ct. 1960), affd, 182 N.E.2d 393, 394 (N.Y. 1962), overruled by
Gelbard v. Genesee Hosp., 664 N.E.2d 1240, 1241-42 (N.Y. 1996); Mahmoodian v.
United Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 404 S.E.2d 750, 756-57 (W. Va. 1991).
48 See Scibetta, supra note 14, at 1036-37.
49 See Leonard v. Prowers County Hosp. Dist., 673 P.2d 1019, 1022-26 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1983); Stiller, 570 N.E.2d at 107; Giles v. Breaux, 160 So. 2d 608, 613-15 (La. Ct.
App. 1964); Ritter v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 637 P.2d 940, 945-47 (Wash. 1981) (en banc).
50 Dallon, supra note 5, at 626-27 & 626 n.172.
51 Huffaker v. Bailey, 540 P.2d 1398, 1402 (Or. 1975) (citations omitted).
52 Shulman, 222 F. Supp. at 64; see also Sosa v. Bd. of Managers of the Val Verde
Mem'l Hosp., 437 F.2d 173, 177 (5th Cir. 1971); Suess v. Pugh, 245 F. Supp. 661,
667-68 (N.D. W. Va. 1965).
53 See Shulman, 222 F. Supp. at 64.
54 558 A.2d 304 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, rather than deciding the
issue on breach of contract grounds, emphasized the public interest
in protecting the physician from arbitrary hospital decisions.5 The
court recognized the importance of bylaws in that they affect public
access to physicians and the quality of treatment.5 6 According to the
court, the hospital's obligation to adhere to its bylaws w indepen-
dent of any finding that the hospital had a contractual duty to abide
by its bylaws.57 As a quasi-administrative review boardr courts can
require that hospitals follow their bylaws to "reduce[ ] the risk of arbi-
trary decisions without unnecessary interference with those who have
the duty and the expertise to make the decisions."5 9 As hospitals be-
came increasingly important to a physician's practice, courts began to
realize that hospitals' decisions regarding physician appointment and
retention required greater oversight than an arbitrary, capricious, and
discriminatory standard, and this was accomplished through constru-
ing bylaws as enforceable contractually.
I. THE SHFT ToWxARDs APPLICATION OF CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES
The inherent limits of arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatoryiy as a
standard for judicial review of a hospital's decision brought some
courts to incorporate contract analysis into hospitals' decisions that
adversely affect the physicians' privileges.61 Usually, a physician who is
a member of the medical staff challenges a Board of Director's deci-
sion to revoke or refuse to grant privileges on the grounds that the
hospital failed to follow promises contained in the bylaws. Judicial
acceptance of medical staff bylaws as a contract differs by jurisdiction
and usually limits relief to circumstances where the hospital does not
abide by a particular reappointment and disciplinary provision in the
bylaws. 62 Many of those same courts, on the other hand, have strug-
gled with applying a breach of the bylaws remedy when confronted
with a hospital's decision to enter into an exclusive contract with a
55 See id. at 308.
56 See id
57 See id.
58 In reviewing bylaws, courts try to mitigate against the risk of arbitrary decisions
without unduly interfering with those with decision-making authority and expertise.
See Gianetti v. Norwalk Hosp., 557 A.2d 1249, 1254-55 (Conn. 1989); Garrow ,. Eliza-
beth Gen. Hosp. & Dispensary, 401 k2d 533, 538-39 (N.J. 1979).
59 Ballissoon, 558 A.2d at 308.
60 See supra notes 3, 47 and accompanying text.
61 See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
62 See Peter E. Borkon, Exclusive Contracts: Are Construdihly Terminated Incurnment
Physicians Entitled to a Fair Hearing?, 17J. LEcA. Mm. 143, 152 (1996).
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physician or group of physicians. Consequently, staff member physi-
cians in these cases are protected only under an arbitrary, capricious,
or discriminatory standard with no inquiry into the hospitals' con-
formance with the bylaws. Because the reasons for which courts either
accept or reject bylaws as a contract 63 aids in the analysis of bylaws in
an exclusive contract setting, an analysis of bylaws' applicability to con-
tract law follows.
A. Contract Analysis
An enforceable contract requires (1) parties with capacity, (2)
proper subject matter, (3) consideration, (4) a bargain, and (5) mani-
festation of mutual assent.64 In the context of medical staff bylaws,
courts' analysis has centered on the areas of proper subject matter,65
consideration, 66 and mutual assent.67 Medical staff bylaws, which typi-
cally define the relationship between the physician and hospital-cov-
ering departmental organization and quality control-create rights
and corresponding duties. 68 Courts disagree, however, over the ex-
tent to which medical staff bylaws provide the physician with a breach
of contract action against the hospital, finding that bylaws either do
not constitute adequate consideration or fail because neither party as-
sented. If medical staff bylaws are treated as a contract, hospitals must
abide by the procedures in the bylaws before they can decide to re-
voke or restrict a physician's privileges, and failure to do so entitles
the physician to contractual remedies.69
1. Consideration
With respect to consideration, some courts have held that the con-
sideration requirement is not met because of the presence of a pre-
existing duty.70 This issue arises because both the JCAHO and state
63 See infra Part III.B.
64 See 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CoNTRAcrS § 3, ch. 2 (4th ed. 1990).
65 See infra Part IIIA.3.
66 See infta Part III.A.1.
67 See infra Part IIIA.2.
68 See Robles v. Humana Hosp. Cartersville, 785 F. Supp. 989, 1001 (N.D. Ga.
1992); Galloway, supra note 9, at 489.
69 SeeRees v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808 P.2d 1069, 1076 (Utah 1991);
cf. Smith v. Cleburne County Hosp., 870 F.2d 1375, 1381 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding a
hospital entitled to relief when the physician fails to abide by the bylaws).
70 SeeJanda v. Madera Cmty. Hosp., 16 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1187 (E.D. Cal. 1998);
Gianetti v. Norwalk Hosp., 557 A.2d 1249, 1253-54 (Conn. 1989); Tredrea v. Anesthe-
sia & Analgesia, P.C., 584 N.W.2d 276, 285 (Iowa 1998); Zipper v. Health Midwest, 978
S.W.2d 398, 416 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
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statutes require that hospitals promulgate bylaws. 7' Thus, a hospital's
pre-existing duty to enact bylaws arises independently of its relation-
ship with the physician2 2 Corbin acknowledged that consideration
may still be present even when there appears to be a pre-existing duty:
[I]f the bargained-for performance rendered by the promisee in-
dudes something that is not within the requirements of the prom-
isee's pre-existing duty, the law of consideration is satisfied. It
makes no difference that the agreed consideration consists almost
wholly of a performance that is already required and that the re-
ceipt of this performance is the principal goal of the promisor. It is
enough that some small additional performance is bargained-for
and given.73
While a hospital's execution of its bylaws by itself, as the Virmani
Court recognized, may not be sufficient consideration to form an en-
forceable contract, when "a hospital offers to extend a particular phy-
sician the privilege to practice medicine in that hospital it goes
beyond its statutory obligation." 74 Similarly in Janda v. Madera Commu-
nity Hospital, the California District Court held that consideration was
met with "the [h]ospital's promise to employ Dr. Janda on stated
terms and conditions and Dr. Janda's promise to work under these
conditions."75 Furthermore, statutes provide the hospital and medical
staff with the discretion of determining the form and content of medi-
cal staff bylaws. 76 This discretion provides hospitals and the medical
staff flexibility in creating corresponding rights and duties that exceed
what hospitals are legally required to do. 7 Thus, courts require some
finding of an additional duty not legally imposed on the hospital, as
an Indiana Court of Appeals opined that an enforceable contract does
not require that each duty have a corresponding right.78
Other courts have found that bylaws fail to satisfy the considera-
tion requirement for want of mutuality, because an at-will physician
may leave without cause. But, an initial agreement wanting mutuality
becomes an enforceable contract upon performance of the condition
71 See Tredrea, 584 N.W.2d at 285; Galloway, supra note 9, at 487.
72 See Robles, 785 F. Supp. at 1001-02; Zipper, 978 S.W.2d at 416.
73 2 ARTmU L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CoNTPrcrs § 7.20 (rev. ed. 1995).
74 Vh-mani v. Presbyterian Health Sers. Corp., 488 S.E.2d 284, 288 (N.C. CL App.
1997); see also Richter v. Danbury, 759 A.2d 106, 110-11 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000).
75 Janda, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1186.
76 See Dallon, supra note 5, at 647.
77 See id
78 See Terre Haute Reg'l Hosp., Inc. v. El-Issa, 470 N.E.2d 1371, 1377 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1984) and cases cited therein; Kokomo Veterans, Inc. v. Schick, 439 N.E.2d 639,
645 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
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precedent, which occurs when the physician begins practicing at a
hospital.79 A physician's decision to practice at a hospital, therefore,
binds that physician to abide with the bylaws. With physicians becom-
ing increasingly dependent on a particular hospital, a physician's reli-
ance on a continued relationship with a hospital, even where an at-will
arrangement exists, emerges from necessity. Once a physician agrees
to abide by rules and procedures outlined in the bylaws, the consider-
ation requirement is satisfied to the extent that the physician creates
and modifies his/her legal relationship with the hospital.8 0 Many
judges have held that as long as the physician practices at a hospital,
that physician is bound by the bylaws, and thus the hospital is bound.
A third aspect of consideration some courts have found lacking is
bargained-for exchange, because bylaws are self-imposed rules for the
hospital and are not a result of negotiating with the physician(s). 8
The Second Restatement of Contracts defines bargaining as occurring
when "it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is
given by the promisee in exchange for that promise.18 2 Upon accept-
ance of the privileges granted in the bylaws, the physician benefits
from the facilities and services of the hospital, and correspondingly,
the hospital benefits from the unique services provided by the physi-
cian and the assurances that the physician will abide by the bylaws.83
In addition, should a physician during the application process refuse
to abide by the bylaws, the hospital could then refuse to extend privi-
leges.8 4 Some courts construe bylaws as part of the contractual rela-
tionship between the physician and the hospital, and as such, the
parties are not required to negotiate over every term to satisfy bar-
gained-for consideration. 85
2. Manifestation of Mutual Assent
Some courts have had difficulty finding mutual assent to be
bound by the bylaws, since the hospital often retains power to unilat-
erally amend the bylaws and/or reserves final authority with the Board
79 See Schick, 439 N.E.2d at 644-45 (citing Obering v. Swain-Roach Lumber Co.,
155 N.E. 712 (Ind. Ct. App. 1927)).
80 See Lyons v. St. Vincent Health Ctr., 731 A.2d 206, 210 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999);
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) or CONTRACTS § 71(1), (3)(c) (1981).
81 See Gianetti v. Nonvalk Hosp., 557 A.2d 1249, 1252-53 (Conn. 1989).
82 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(2) (1981).
83 See Virmani v. Presbyterian Health Servs. Corp., 488 S.E.2d 284, 287-88 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1997).
84 See Dallon, supra note 5, at 656.
85 See 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CoNTRACTS § 2.3 (1990).
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of Directors.86 This argument raises tvo separate issues. First, the
hospital may not have assented to be bound when the Board's role is
limited to approval of bylaws adopted by the medical staff for the pur-
pose of self-regulation.87 As indicated earlier, the very purpose of by-
laws is to codify the procedural requirements for the hospital when
the hospital seeks to revoke, restrict, or terminate a physician's privi-
leges. Second, retention of the hospital's authority to unilaterally
amend bylaws and/or a reservation of final authority wvith the Board
may manifest an intention not to be bound.88 In these situations, a
hospital's intent to be bound may still manifest itself through the ac-
tions between the parties, language of the bylaws, or both.8 9 Fre-
quently, a physician's membership and privileges are conditioned
upon agreement to follow the bylaws.90 Furthermore, the JCAHO
places responsibility on accredited hospitals to assure that physician-
applicants understand the bylaw procedures for granting appoint-
ments and privileges,91 suggesting a common understanding through
trade practice. It seems that, given the importance of medical staff
bylaws in defining the hospital and physician relationship, a finding of
mutual assent naturally follows in most circumstances.
3. Public Policy Grounds
A reason, falling under appropriateness of subject matter, some
courts have found for not enforcing bylaws as a contract is that doing
so would undermine the hospital's administration and unjustifiably
impede on what should be a discretionary judgment.92 To construe
86 Cf Terre Haute Reg'l Hosp., Inc. v. El-Issa, 470 N.E.2d 1371, 1377 (Ind. CL
App. 1984) (holding that the Board manifested an intent to be bound despite it hav-
ing final authority), with Zipper v. Health Midwest, 978 S.W.2d 398, 416-17 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1998) (holding that one of the reasons bylaws do not constitute a contract is that
the Board had ultimate authority with respect to bylaw procedure).
87 See Berberian v. Landcaster Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 149 A.2d 456, 461 (Pa.
1959) (Bell, J., dissenting).
88 See Robles v. Humana Hosp. Cartersville, 785 F. Supp. 989, 1002 (N.D. Ga.
1992).
89 See Terre Haute Reg'Y Hosp., Inc., 470 N.E.2d at 1377.
90 See, e.g., Wuchenich v. Shenandoah Mem'l Hosp., No. 99-1273, 2000 U.S. App.
LEXIS 11557, at *23-*24 (4th Cir. May 22, 2000); Robles, 785 F. Supp. at 1001; Richter
v. Danbury, 759 A.2d 106, 109 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000); Rees v. Intermountain Health
Care, Inc., 808 P.2d 1069, 1076 (Utah 1991); Bass v. Ambrosius, 520 N.W.2d 625, 628
(Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
91 See Cowan, supra note 24, at 859.
92 See Gianetti v. Nonvalk Hosp., 557 A.2d 1249, 1253 (Conn. 1989); Zipper v.
Health Midwest, 978 S.W.2d 398, 417 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (citing Richardson %,. St.
John's Mercy Hosp., 674 S.W.2d 200, 201 (Mo. CL App. 1984)).
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bylaws as a contract, under this view, would require the courts to sub-
stitute its judgment for the hospital's on internal matters that are best
determined by those more informed.9 3 According to this view, a hos-
pital is most aware of its surrounding circumstances, and the threat of
contractual liability may deter hospitals from terminating physicians
when such decisions ultimately may be in the public's best interests9 1
Therefore, the more effective balance between the physicians' interest
and the public's interest, the argument goes, is achieved by limiting
judicial review to guard against the risk of arbitrary decisions' 5 Fear
of judicial intervention on grounds of substituting its judgment
amounts to iinjustified refusal by the courts to provide physicians with
a remedy against the hospital when it breaches implied promises.
B. Judicial Treatment of Bylaws as Contracts
Courts, on occasion, have drawn analogies between hospital by-
laws and employee handbooks. 96 Some jurisdictions rule in favor of
treating bylaws as an enforceable contract by viewing them as analo-
gous to employee handbooks. 97 Other jurisdictions deny contractual
relief for employee handbooks on the grounds that they are unilateral
expressions of policy but uphold bylaws as enforceable promises by
distinguishing them from employee handbooks.98 Still, other jurisdic-
tions reject both bylaws and employee handbooks as contractually en-
forceable on the same grounds as employee handbooks because in
both cases they find that the language, under most circumstances, is
nonspecific and goal oriented.99
A court's ruling that bylaws are contractually enforceable is not
determinative of the probability of relief granted to a physician. As
discussed below, a court's finding that bylaws are generally contractu-
ally binding requires further determination of whether contractual
93 See Robes, 785 F. Supp. at 1002. Perhaps, as one court suggested, this would
impute onto the piysician an absolute right to work at a hospital. See Zipper, 978
S.W.2d at 417.
94 See Zipper, 978 S.W.2d at 417.
95 See Owens v. New Britain Gen. Hosp., 643 A.2d 233, 240-41 (Conn. 1994);
Yeargin v. Hamilton Mem'l Hosp., 171 S.E.2d 136, 139 (Ga. 1969).
96 See, e.g.,Jandav. Madera Cmty. Hosp., 16 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1188-89 (E.D. Cal.
1998); Tredrea v. Anesthesia & Analgesia, P.C., 584 N.W.2d 276, 285-86 (Iowa 1998);
Virmani v. Presbyterian Health Servs. Corp., 488 S.E.2d 284, 288 n.5 (N.C. Ct. App.
1997).
97 See, e.g., Bass v. Ambrosius, 520 N.W.2d 625, 627-28 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
98 See, e.g., Virman4 488 S.E.2d at 288 n.5.
99 See, e.g., Tredrea, 584 N.W.2d at 286; Bender v. Suburban Hosp., Inc., No. 2000,
2000 Md. App. LEXIS 148, at *67-*68 (Ct. Spec. App. Sept. 7, 2000); Hrehorovich v.
Harbor Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 614 A.2d 1021, 1031-34 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992).
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remedies are available on a case-by-case basis or without regard to the
factual circumstances.
1. Bylaws Not Enforceable as a Contract
The most judicially deferential approach rejects the notion that
bylaws may be contractually enforceable. Instead, judicial review is
limited to a hospital's substantial compliance with the reappointment
or disciplinary procedures in the bylaws. 100 The idea here is that if the
parties truly intended the "promises" contained in bylaws to be bind-
ing, then they could have arranged for this in a separate employment
contract. 01 Courts deny relief under contract law for failure of bylaws
to satisfy contractual requirements of consideration or assent 02 and
on policy grounds that additional court involvement would unduly in-
terfere with the hospital's ability to determine adequately their medi-
cal staff needs. 03 According to this view, a court's requirement that a
hospital substantially comply with its bylaws advances fairness for both
parties and best balances the physician's occupational interests with
the hospital's interest in determining its own affairs.'04 By contrast,
where bylaws are construed as a legally binding contract, the hospital
may be held to a standard of "strict compliance," 0 5 rather than "sub-
stantial compliance." 0 6
100 See Robles v. Humana Hosp. Cartersille, 785 F. Supp. 989, 1001-02 (N.D. Ga.
1992); SL Mary's Hosp. v. Radiology Prof'l Corp., 421 S.E.2d 731, 736 (Ga. CL App.
1992); Long v. Chelsea Cmty. Hosp., 557 N.W.2d 157, 162 (Mich. CL App. 1996);
Zipper v. Health Midwest, 978 S.W.2d 398, 416 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); Manczur V.
Southside Hosp., 183 N.Y.S.2d 960, 962 (App. Div. 1959); Mahmoodian v. United
Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 404 S.E.2d 750, 756 (V. Va. 1991).
101 See Zipper, 978 S.W.2d at 417; Manczur, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 962.
102 See supra Part III.A.1-2; see also, eg., Shulman v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 319 F. Supp.
252, 255 (D.D.C. 1970).
103 See supra Part IIIA3; see also, eg., Claycomb v. HCA-Raleigh Cmty. Hosp., 333
S.E.2d 333, 336 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that decisions must be rationally "re-
lated to the operation of the hospital").
104 See Mahmoodian, 404 S.E.2d at 757.
105 See Mller v. Ind. Hosp., 419 A.2d 1191, 1193 (Pa. Super. CL 1980).
106 See Islami v. Covenant Med. Ctr., Inc., 822 F. Supp. 1361, 1372-73 (N.D. Iov a
1992); Even v. Longmont United Hosp. Ass'n, 629 P.2d 1100, 1102 (Colo. Ct. App.
1981); Owens v. New Britain Gen. Hosp., 643 A.2d 233, 240-41 (Conn. 1994) (citing
Gianetti v. Norwalk Hosp., 557 A.2d 1249 (Conn. 1989)); Keskin v. Munster Med.
Research Found., 580 N.E.2d 354, 359 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Friedman v. Mem'l
Hosp., 523 N.E.2d 252, 523 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988); Malhtnoodian, 404 S.E.2d at 755.
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2. Bylaws Enforceable as a Contract on a Case-by-Case Basis
Another approach is to determine whether bylaws constitute a
contract on a case-by-case basis; that is, bylaws may become contractu-
ally binding only upon a factual determination.10 7 For example, an
Indiana court held that medical staff bylaws constitute a contract
when both parties had admitted an intention to be bound. 0 8 Courts
using this approach usually analyze the language of the bylaws and the
conduct of the parties to ascertain the existence of an intent to con-
tract.'0 9 In so ruling, courts often limit a physician's breach of con-
tract claim under the bylaws to those procedures provided for
expressly in the bylaws. 110 Typically, courts will incorporate the bylaws
into any other existing contractual agreements between the physician
and the hospital, viewing bylaws as part of the contractual
relationship."'1
3. Bylaws Enforceable as a Contract Per Se
Another treatment of hospital bylaws is to view them as a contract
per se upon approval by the Board of Directors, without inquiry into
the language of the bylaws or conduct of the parties. 112 The idea here
107 See, e.g., Ingraffia v. NME Hosps., Inc., 943 F.2d 561, 565-66 (5th Cir. 1991);
Janda v. Madera Cmty. Hosp., 16 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1186-89 (E.D. Cal. 1998); Steuer v.
Nat'l Med. Enters., Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1489, 1527 (D.S.C. 1987); Gianelli, 557 A.2d at
1255; Richter v. Danbury, 759 A.2d 106, 110-11 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000); Keskin, 580
N.E.2d at 359-62; Terre Haute Reg'l Hosp., Inc. v. El-Issa, 470 N.E.2d 1371, 1377-79
(Ind. Ct. App. 1984); Tredrea v. Anesthesia & Analgesia, P.C., 584 N.W.2d 276,
284-87 (Iowa 1998); Munoz v. Flower Hosp., 507 N.E.2d 360, 865 (Ohio Ct. App.
1985); Weary v. Baylor Univ. Hosp., 360 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); Bass v.
Ambrosius, 520 N.W.2d 625, 628 (Wis. Ct App. 1994); cf Bryant v. Glen Oaks Med.
Ctr., 650 N.E.2d 622, 629 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (holding that the presence of an at-will
arrangement precludes granting relief).
108 See Porter Mem'l Hosp. v. Malak, 484 N.E.2d 54, 61 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
109 See Islami, 822 F. Supp. at 1371; Tredrea, 584 N.W.2d at 285.
110 See Posner v. Lankenau Hosp., 645 F. Supp. 1102, 1107 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (citing
Adler v. Montefiore Hosp. Ass'n, 311 A.2d 634 (Pa. 1973)); see also Tredrea, 584
N.W.2d at 285, 287.
111 See, e.g., Pariser v. Christian Health Care Sys., Inc., 816 F.2d 1248, 1251 (8th
Cir. 1987), afd, 859 F.2d 78 (8th Cir. 1988); Eidelson v. Archer, 645 P.2d 171, 178
(Alaska 1982); Adler, 311 A.2d at 645; Berberian v. Lancaster Osteopathic Hosp,
Ass'n, 149 A.2d 456, 458-60 (Pa. 1959).
112 See Posner, 645 F. Supp. at 1106, 1111 (citing Berberian, 149 A.2d at 456); Samar-
itan Health Sys. v. Superior Court, 981 P.2d 584, 588 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998); Gashgdi v.
Me. Med. Ass'n, 350 A.2d 571, 575 (Me. 1976) (citing Libby v. Perry, 311 A.2d 527,
532 (Me. 1973)); Virmani v. Presbyterian Health Servs. Corp., 488 S.E.2d 284, 288
(N.C. Ct. App. 1997); St.John's Hosp. Med. Staffv. St.John Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 245
N.W.2d 472, 474-75 (S.D. 1976).
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is that if hospitals are not required to abide strictly with its bylaws, the
bylaws are void of any meaning.113 If a hospital fails to follow bylaw
procedures, the physician is entitled to hospital compliance. For ex-
ample, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted a physician an in-
junction, requiring the hospital to strictly comply with its procedural
provisions of notice of charges and a hearing.114
4. Remedy Under Breach of Bylaw Contract
The importance of recognizing bylaws as a contract not only lies
in the greater judicial review, but also in the relief available to the
physician. If a court holds that an enforceable contract exists, a physi-
cian may be entitled to damages.115 To recover damages, a physician
must demonstrate that the hospital's decision would have been differ-
ent had it followed its bylaw procedures.'1 6 Without sufficient evi-
dence, a physician is only entitled to nominal damages unless the
physician can show reasonable reliance in foregoing other offered po-
sitions while awaiting a hospital's decision to follow its bylaws."17 The
granting of an injunction, requiring the hospital to abide by its bylaw
procedures, varies from state to state.118
113 See Berberian, 149 A.2d at 459; see also Lewisburg Cmty. Hosp., Inc.. . Alfredson,
805 S.W.2d 756, 759 (Tenn. 1991).
114 See Berbefian, 149 A.2d at 459-60.
115 SeeJanda v. Madera Cmty. Hosp., 16 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1186 (E.D. Cal. 1998);
see also Brader v. Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 64 F.3d 869, 878-79 (3d Cir. 1995); Rees v.
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808 P.2d 1069, 1078-79 (Utah 1991).
116 See Sibley v. Lutheran Hosp., 709 F. Supp. 657, 662 (D. Md. 1989).
117 See id.
118 See, e.g., Lawler v. Eugene Wuesthoff Mem'l Hosp. Ass'n, 497 So. 2d 1261,
1264-65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Porter Mem'l Hosp. v. Malak, 484 N.E.2d 54,
61-62 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that an injunction is available where plaintiff
"will suffer great injury" and shows that the legal remedy is inadequate); Missouri ex
reL Willman v. St. Joseph Hosp., 684 S.W. 2d 408, 411 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (holding
that an injunction is not granted where deviation from bylas was of "no conse-
quence"); Berberian, 149 A.2d at 459 (finding that remedies provided by statute or
found in a "voluntary association" require strict compliance as the exclusive remedy);
Das v. Greene County Mem'l Hosp., No. 8, 1987 Pa. D. & C. LEXIS 202, at *11
(Commw. Ct. June 12, 1987) (holding that no injunction is issued when damnages
adequately compensate).
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IV. BREACH OF Bx'Aws CAUSED BY CONSTRUCTIVE REVOCATION
A. Enforcement of Bylaws as a Remedy for Constructive Revocation
The court in Strauss v. Peninsula Regional Medical Center1 9 had the
opportunity to recognize that a breach of the bylaw contract can oc-
cur where a physician's privileges are constructively revoked. The
court, instead, held that Strauss,120 the physician, was entitled to relief
for breach of the bylaws once the hospital had independently decided
to terminate his privileges, 21 rather than choosing to base its holding
on a hospital's decision to enter into an exclusive contract with a third
party group of physicians.
Strauss brought a breach of contract action, among other claims,
for the termination of his staff privileges upon the execution of an
exclusive contract with a "new management group."' 22 Peninsula Re-
gional Medical Center (Peninsula) and Strauss previously entered into
an exclusive contract, which granted Strauss active medical staff privi-
leges pursuant to Peninsula bylaws. 123 In 1992, after his exclusive con-
tract had expired, Strauss remained as a member of the open medical
staff. 124 During this time, Peninsula grew concerned after Strauss dis-
closed that he was in the process of building a nearby radiation ther-
apy facility and as animosity intensified between the two radiation
oncology groups.' 25 In response, the Board of Directors at Peninsula
granted an exclusive contract to the Drake/Blumberg group, over a
unanimous objection from the medical staff and a proposal by Strauss
for the two to workjointly.126 Strauss's privileges would continue only
after the hospital accepted him into the Drake/Blumberg group.12 7
Soon after their agreement, the Board adopted a resolution to termi-
nate his medical staff privileges.128
Rather than deny that the bylaws ever created contractual obliga-
tions, Peninsula contended that the medical staff bylaws only applied
where a physician's privileges are "restricted or revoked due to spe-
cific acts or omissions"129 and did not apply to managerial decisions
119 916 F. Supp. 528 (D. Md. 1996).
120 Dr. DeMassi, by virtue of being hired by Dr. Strauss, joined in the litigation.
121 Strauss, 916 F. Supp. at 533-34.
122 Id. at 532.
123 See id. at 531.
124 See id. at 532.
125 See id.
126 See id. at 534.
127 See id at 535.
128 See id. at 536.
129 Id. at 538 (citation omitted).
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concerning operational and financial matters. 13 0 Peninsula also ar-
gued that their medical staff privileges terminated, in any event, upon
the expiration of the exclusive contract.13 1 The court refused to apply
Anne Arundel General Hospital, Inc. v. O'Brien,i3 2 which held that the
bylaws were not binding where the hospital's decision was managerial
and not covered by the bylaws.13 3 Unlike O'Brien, where an exclusive
contract was awarded to another physician immediately following the
expiration of the previous exclusive contract, 3 4 Strauss maintained
and exercised his medical staff privileges as a member of the open
medical staff.'3 5 Another notable difference was that the Peninsula
board failed to completely close their staff since Peninsula extended
opportunities, conditioned on acceptance of certain concessions, to
members of the previous medical staff, excluding the plaintiffs.' G A
third difference was that, in O'Brien, the medical staff privileges ex-
pired at the same time as the exclusive contract, whereas in Strauss,
Strauss's privileges continued for an additional two years until Penin-
sula formally revoked them.13 7 Finally, Strauss submitted sufficient ev-
idence in the trial court to suggest that the Peninsula's decision to
terminate his privileges was motivated by disciplinary reasons.'3
The Strauss court held that Strauss had introduced sufficient evi-
dence to permit the trial court to consider a breach of contract action
for the hospital's failure to follow procedural bylaw protections before
formally terminating his privileges.13 9 In remanding the case to the
trial court, the Strauss court should have instructed the trial court to
consider Peninsula's decision to enter into an exclusive contract with
the Drake/Blumberg group as a constructive revocation of Strauss's
privileges. It is uncertain whether the outcome would have been the
same had the hospital never officially terminated Strauss's privileges,
although his privileges in either case would have become nonex-
ercisable. In such cases, not only does a strong inference arise that
the actions of the hospital might have been in bad faith, but the con-
duct of the parties may also give rise to a contract implied-in-fact. 140
130 See id. at 537-38.
131 See id. at 538.
132 432 A.2d 483 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981).
133 See Strauss, 916 F. Supp. at 538-40.
134 See O'Brien, 432 A.2d at 486.
135 See Strauss, 916 F. Supp. at 539-40.
136 See id at 540.
137 Seeid
138 See i& at 540-43.
139 See id& at 543-44.
140 Examples may include situations where the physician and/or hospital follovs
policies that extend beyond the scope of the bylamw or where the hospital-in the
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The Strauss court fell short of ensuring that hospital decisions, even
those not expressly covered in the bylaws, must conform to the par-
ties' reasonable expectations.
B. Bylaws Not Providing a Remedy for Constructive Revocation
A court refusing to recognize constructive revocation as a breach
of the bylaws can be found in Garibaldi v. Applebaum.141 In Garibaldi,
the plaintiff, Garibaldi, was a member of the medical staff who en-
joyed clinical privileges.' 42 While he retained membership, Apple-
baum, who had previously not been a member of the physician
medical staff, entered into an exclusive contract with St. Francis Hos-
pital, which Garibaldi contended terminated his privileges without no-
tice and a hearing pursuant to the bylaws. 143 The court rejected the
plaintiff's argument that the exclusive contract agreement revoked his
privileges, finding that the hospital's decision was not based upon
judgment regarding the physician's ability to work at a hospital and
not based on the physician's exercise of privileges, which must have
been influenced by numerous reasons including disciplinary or eco-
nomic.14 4 The O'Brien court added,
A managerial decision concerning operation of the hospital
made rationally and in good faith by the board to which operation
of the hospital is committed by law should not be countermanded
by the courts unless it clearly appears it is unlawful or will seriously
injure a significant public interest.
Judges are untrained and courts ill-equipped for hospital ad-
ministration, and it is neither possible nor desirable for the courts
to act as supervening boards of directors for every nonprofit hospi-
tal corporation in the state. 145
process of deciding whether to execute an exclusive contract-abides by some of the
bylaw procedures.
141 742 N.E.2d 279 (Ill. 2000).
142 Id. at 280.
143 Id. at 281. Incidentally, while the case was on appeal, the bylaws had been
amended to provide for at least sixty days notice in order to conform to recently
enacted statutory requirements for instances when the hospital entered into an exclu-
sive contract with a third party. See id. at 282.
144 See id. at 284-85; see also Bartley v. E. Me. Med. Ctr., 617 A.2d 1020, 1022-23
(Me. 1992); Holt v. Good Samaritan Hosp. & Health Ctr., 590 N.E.2d 1318, 1323
(Ohio Ct. App. 1990); Gonzalez v. San Jacinto Methodist Hosp., 880 S.W.2d 436, 440
(Tex. App. 1994), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Calvillo v. Gonzalez, 922 SW.2d 928,
929 (Tex. 1996).
145 Anne Arundel Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. O'Brien, 432 A.2d 483, 490 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1981) (quoting Centero v. Roseville Cmty. Hosp., 107 Cal. Rptr. 183 (Ct. App.
1979)).
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The bylaws, the court found, only apply to hospital decisions re-
lating to the physician's competence, not administratively motivated
decisions.' 46 Because no revocation, suspension, or reduction of ex-
isting privileges occurred, the court declined to subject the hospital's
decision to judicial review.147
Many courts while recognizirg that exclusive contract arrange-
ments might have the incidental effect of terminating one's privileges
hold that "it does not reduce or alter... staff privileges as such."' 48
Indeed, a physician whose privileges remain intact despite an exclu-
sive contract between the hospital and a third party may use such priv-
ileges to find other employment opportunities in the hospital.1 49
Bylaw procedures only protect the physician from exclusion or expul-
sion arising from a hospital's determination that a physician is unfit to
practice at that hospital. 150 Membership to the medical staff does not
afford a physician with a vested right to practice absent an employ-
ment contract for a specified term.'-' Counterbalanced against the
physician's interest, hospitals must be provided with administrative
discretion "to implement policies and programs that it deems reasona-
ble."152 Despite policy considerations favoring greater hospital discre-
tion in negotiating exclusive contracts, stong legal and policy reasons
provide support for adoption of the doctrine of constructive revoca-
tion in the context of medical staff privileges.
C. The Rationale for Bylaws Remedying Constructive Revocation
Courts should not immediately assume that a hospital's decision
to enter into an exclusive contract is outside the contemplation of the
parties. Rather, they should consider the exchange of implied
promises in determining whether the hospital followed bylaw proce-
146 See Garibaldi, 742 N.E.2d at 280."
147 See id. at 284-85.
148 Tenet Health Ltd. v. Zamora, 13 S.W.3d 464, 469 (Tex. App. 2000); me also
Hager v. Venice Hosp., 944 F. Supp. 1530, 1533-34 (M.D. Fla. 1996); Garibaldi, 742
N.E.2d at 284-85.
149 See Hager, 944 F. Supp. at 1534; Gonzalez, 880 S.W.2d at 440.
150 See Richter v. Danbury Hosp., No. 307869, 1998 WL 321853, at *4 (Conn.
Super. Ct.June 9, 1998), rev'd in part 759 A.2d 106 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000); Bloom v.
Clara Maass Med. Ctr., 685 A.2d 966, 972 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996); Read v.
McKennan Hosp., 610 N.W.2d 782, 786-87 (S.D. 2000), criticized in Richter v. Dan-
bury Hosp., 759 A.2d 106, 112-13 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000); Tenet Health Dd., 13 S.W.3d
at 469.
151 See Leider v. Beth Israel Hosp. Ass'n, 229 N.Y.S.2d 134, 137 (Sup. CL 1960),
affd, 182 N.E.2d 393, 394 (N.Y. 1962), overmled by Gelbard v. Genesee Hosp., 664
N.E.2d 1240, 1241-42 (N.Y. 1996); Tenet Heafit Ltd., 13 S.W.3d at 471-72.
152 Tenet Health Ltd., 13 S.W.3d at 471.
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dures upon entering into a third party exclusive contract. The pres-
ence of mixed disciplinary and managerial motives, as described in
Strauss, provides the most compelling example of where the physi-
cian's reasonable expectations are that a hospital's decision, stem-
ming from evaluation or disciplinary action, must conform to the
bylaws. Courts should not wait until a hospital has formally decided to
reduce or terminate a physician's privileges, usually limited to discipli-
nary matters and judgments based on one's qualifications. 1-3 For one,
a court's inquiry into a hospital's decision can prevent hospitals from
circumventing bylaw procedural protections afforded to the physi-
cian.'54 Under some circumstances, reasonable expectations may ex-
tend to include hospital decisions that are not expressly mentioned in
the bylaws.
Those courts that deny relief to a physician whose privileges are
constructively revoked due to an exclusive contract fail to recognize
the potential existence of an implied-in-fact contract or one made by
"process of implication and inference."'155 Drawing from employee
handbook cases, reasonable expectations may arise from a number of
factors "including 'the personnel policies or practices of the [hospi-
tal], the [physician's] longevity of service, actions or communications
by the [hospital] reflecting assurances of continued employment, and
the practices in the industry .... 111156 Courts should revisit this issue
in light of the fact that the relationship between the physician and the
hospital is changing through greater specialization and increased
competition among physicians for access to hospitals. Thus, the physi-
cian's ability to engage in self-help is becoming less practical as physi-
cians are unable to exercise privileges outside their specialty and as
the opportunity for referral to another hospital in the community is
153 See Chayet & Reardon, supra note 11, at 309.
154 See Spunberg v. Columbia/JFK Med. Ctr., No. 97-8937 AH, 1997 WL 868607, at
*2 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 23, 1997).
155 1 CORBIN, supra note 73, § 1.19.
156 Janda v. Madera Cmty. Hosp., 16 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1188 (E.D. Cal. 1998)
(quoting Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 387 (Cal. 1988)). Invariably,
this determination is a question of fact. Id.
[Other factors] include written or oral negotiations, the conduct of the par-
ties from the commencement of the employment relationship, the usages of
the business, the situation and objective of the parties giving rise to the rela-
tionship, the nature of the employment, and any other circumstances sur-
rounding the employment relationship which would tend to explain or
make clear the intention of the parties at the time said employment
commenced.
Koehler v. Hunter Care Ctrs., Inc., 6 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1242 (D. Kan. 1998) (quoting
Morriss v. Coleman Co., 738 P.2d 841, 848-49 (Kan. 1987)).
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dwindling. As the Florida Court of Appeals held, "the loss of staff priv-
ileges equates to loss of patients and ability to practice in this doctor's
specialty ....- s Courts should extend this line of reasoning to physi-
cians whose privileges are adversely affected by the dosing of a hospi-
tal's medical staff by an exclusive contract. This is merely recognizing
that there are circumstances under which the fair notice and hearing
provisions may be within the contemplation of the parties.
The current approach is inadequate insofar as instances arise in
which a physician, seeking protection against an unfair and/or arbi-
trary hospital decision, is denied relief because the court limits its
analysis to the express provisions in the bylaws. Instead, courts should
inquire into the nature of the relationship shared between the partic-
ular physician and the hospital and the motivating factors underlying
the hospital's decision. Without explicit reference in the bylaws to all
types of hospital decisions, physicians are sometimes left without a
remedy for what amounts to a loss of privileges, despite the fact that a
physician may have reasonably expected the hospital to follow proce-
dures, including instances where the introduction of a third party ex-
clusive contract adversely affects the physician's ability to exercise
privileges. Where the court determines that the hospital, through its
conduct, provided assurances to staff member physicians of continued
employment, relief should be provided when a hospital breaches
those promises by entering into a third party exclusive contract with-
out first following bylaw procedures. Even where no such reasonable
expectations of continued employment exist, the physician, at the very
least, should be entitled to a review of the hospital's motivations
where evidence suggests mixed motives. In cases where the hospital's
decision is based largely on a judgment of competence or is discipli-
nary, physicians should be entitled to relief where the hospital fails to
abide by its bylaws, such as providing fair notice and a hearing.
The interactions between the physician and the hospital, notwith-
standing the motives surrounding a hospital's decision, may give rise
to reasonable expectations that any decision adversely affecting the
physician's privileges will be subject to the bylaw's notice and fair
hearing procedures. Indeed, providing a cause of action to a con-
structively terminated physician is not much different from many
courts that provide relief for a hospital's decision based on grounds of
a physician's competency. A hospital's decision to enter into an exclu-
sive contract is as much a managerial decision as it is a judgment of
the staff physicians' competency, as the former similarly involves eco-
157 Lawler v. Eugene Wuesthoff Mem'l Hosp. Ass'n, 497 So. 2d 1261, 1264 (Fla.
Dist. Ct App. 1986).
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nomic considerations, as well as the physicians' relative strengths and
weaknesses. Hospital decisions to discipline or deny reappointment,
by nature, entail managerial considerations, yet many courts have
found little difficulty in applying contractual relief. Moreover, bylaws
typically contain procedures for reappointment on a periodic basis,
which requires the hospital to balance considerations ranging from
the physician's qualifications to the hospital's needs.
Such an extension, given the peculiarity of the physician/hospital
relationship, would be limited in application to physicians and would
not place an undue burden on the hospital. The unique relationship
between the physician and the hospital would limit application of this
rule to specialized physicians. Physicians, unlike in other employment
contexts, are granted privileges of the type found in the bylaws which
govern the parties' duties and obligations (specifically hiring and
reappointing). Organizationally, as members of the medical staff, and
statutorily, physicians share a relationship with the hospital not found
anywhere else and, as a result, enjoy additional protections such as a
fair hearing and prior notice even though no employment contract so
provides.
Also, the public's interest in ensuring the availability of quality
physicians is unparalleled, suggesting that courts are justified in deter-
mining whether the expectations of the parties were realized beyond
the express language of the bylaws. Requiring that hospitals use the
notice and hearing provisions in the bylaws can also ensure that the
hospital's decision is informed and fair.158 Hospitals, through reason-
able foresight, can guard against this risk through such measures as
coordinating the commencement and termination of exclusive con-
tracts and ensuring, through its policies, procedures, and careful re-
cord-keeping, its decision is not meant as disciplinary or as a
judgment of the physician's competence, and no reasonable expecta-
tions of continued employment arose. Hospitals may also provide
physicians opportunity to contribute to those hospital decisions in
which the physician has a material interest. 15 9 Any fear, therefore,
that litigation against the hospital will increase is unfounded since
hospitals themselves can mitigate against the risk of litigation.
Those situations, similar to O'Brien, in which the terms of the ex-
clusive contract and medical staff membership terminate at once or
within a reasonable period of time ordinarily will not give rise to an
158 SeeVolcjak v. Wash. County Hosp. Ass'n, 723 A.2d 463, 471 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1999).
159 See, e.g., Anne Arundel Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. O'Brien, 432 A.2d 483, 491 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1981).
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inference between the parties that an implied-in-fact contract exists.
The scope of the physician's remedy would extend only to hospital
decisions adversely affecting the physician's enjoyment of staff privi-
leges and allow a hospital's managerial decision to be reviewable by
the courts when factual circumstances give rise to the existence of
continued employment or nonmanagerial motives. Courts ought to
be cognizant of the fact that reasonable expectations of physicians
and hospitals and strong public policy interests justify determination
on a case-by-case basis of whether implied promises stemming from
the bylaws and the relationship between the physician and the hospi-
tal were breached.
CONCLUSION
The evolving role of the hospital has challenged courts and academ-
ics to re-analyze the relationship between the hospital and the physi-
cian. With the emergence of medical staff bylaws, courts have been
confronted with the issue of whether breach of contract remedies
should be available. Judicial deference did not adequately realize the
expectations of both parties, nor, as a collateral yet important matter,
did they satisfy the concerns of the public. Courts through applying
breach of contract remedies to bylaws have made progress in protect-
ing the physician beyond those hospital decisions that are arbitrary or
discriminatory. Where courts decide to limit bylaw contractual relief
to formal revocation of membership privileges, they unfairly exclude
those physicians whose privileges, by virtue of a hospital's decision,
become nonexercisable. At a time where physicians increasingly rely
on access to hospitals and the denial or revocation of privileges has
devastating consequences to physicians, courts must also ensure that
medical staff bylaws are adhered to where the physician's privileges
have been constructively revoked. Instances will arise in which a hos-
pital adequately follows bylaw procedure in terminating a physician's
privileges or the factual circumstances will not give rise to an implied-
in-fact contract. Nevertheless, courts, by recognizing that bylaws
should be contractually enforceable when medical staff privileges are
constructively revoked, provide physicians with protection from hospi-
tals' decisions consistent with the parties' reasonable expectations and
our notion of fairness.
20011 1517
1518' NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL, 76:rl
